Designing Yemen’s Future Connectivity Architecture: Fibre, Mobile, Satellite and Subsea

Part 2 of the Bridge Connect Insight series: Yemen’s Digital Reconstruction

Executive summary

Yemen’s telecommunications infrastructure cannot simply be restored to its pre-war form.

Years of conflict have damaged networks, interrupted investment and divided the institutions responsible for operating and regulating the sector. Demand has also changed. Households, businesses, government agencies and humanitarian organisations increasingly need dependable broadband rather than basic voice coverage. Satellite connectivity has created alternatives to traditional national infrastructure, while disruption to submarine cables in and around the Red Sea has demonstrated the vulnerability of international connectivity.

The central question is therefore not:

How can Yemen rebuild the network it had?

It is:

What combination of infrastructure would give Yemen affordable, resilient and nationally inclusive connectivity for the next 15 years?

The answer is not a single nationwide fibre network, universal 5G or wholesale dependence on satellite.

Yemen requires a layered architecture in which different technologies perform different roles:

• Submarine cables provide high-capacity international connectivity.

• Geographically diverse terrestrial and satellite routes provide international resilience.

• National fibre and microwave networks connect cities, operators and strategic infrastructure.

• 4G mobile networks provide the principal means of mass-market broadband access.

• Fibre-to-the-premises is deployed selectively where demand and economics justify it.

• Fixed wireless access extends broadband without requiring extensive last-mile cabling.

• Low Earth orbit satellite services connect remote areas and provide rapidly deployable resilience.

• HAPS and other non-terrestrial systems may eventually provide targeted coverage, emergency capacity and critical-infrastructure support.

• Shared infrastructure, renewable power and open wholesale access reduce duplication and make investment more viable.

This architecture must also reflect Yemen’s political and economic realities. Infrastructure crosses areas controlled by different authorities. Most consumers have limited purchasing power. Electricity is unreliable. Foreign currency is scarce, imported equipment is expensive and many network sites are difficult to reach or protect.

The appropriate strategy is therefore one of progressive resilience: first protect essential services and remove the most dangerous single points of failure; then expand shared national capacity; and only afterwards introduce more advanced services where demand can sustain them.

Yemen does not need the most technologically advanced network in the region. It needs the network architecture best suited to its geography, economy, security conditions and reconstruction priorities.

Architecture must follow national objectives

Telecommunications strategies often begin with technology targets: kilometres of fibre, numbers of towers, spectrum assignments or the introduction of 5G. Those measures are useful, but they are not a national connectivity strategy.

Yemen must first decide what its future communications system is expected to accomplish.

At a minimum, it should:

1. Give most Yemenis access to affordable broadband.

2. Connect major cities, ports and economic corridors.

3. support government, healthcare, education and humanitarian services.

4. Allow operators and service providers to compete.

5. Maintain essential communications when individual routes, sites or power systems fail.

6. Reduce reliance on a small number of international gateways.

7. Connect rural and remote communities that conventional networks cannot serve economically.

8. Protect national security without isolating Yemen from global digital services.

9. Attract investment without creating new private or state-controlled monopolies.

10. Allow the architecture to evolve as political and economic conditions improve.

These objectives point towards a layered, technology-neutral model rather than a single national megaproject.

They also require a distinction between coverage, capacity, availability and meaningful access.

A mobile signal on a coverage map does not necessarily provide reliable broadband. A fibre cable passing through a province does not mean that schools, clinics or businesses can connect to it. Satellite capacity may technically be available but remain unaffordable to most households. A network may operate under normal conditions yet fail when power, fuel or one international route is disrupted.

Success should therefore be measured by the services people and institutions can use—not merely by the infrastructure installed.

The existing network cannot simply be replaced

Yemen already has telecommunications infrastructure, operating companies, trained employees, customer relationships, spectrum use and international connections. A reconstruction strategy must make use of these assets.

However, the condition, ownership and strategic value of those assets vary considerably. Some infrastructure may be repairable. Some may remain technically operational but be commercially or technologically obsolete. Other assets may be valuable because of their location even if the installed equipment requires replacement.

The World Bank has previously identified institutional fragmentation, inadequate infrastructure and constrained international connectivity as major impediments to Yemen’s digital development. Its assessment noted reliance on a limited number of submarine systems, weaknesses in national connectivity and the consequences of divided control over institutions such as TeleYemen.

The reconstruction process therefore needs a national infrastructure baseline covering:

• Fibre routes and their condition

• Microwave links

• Mobile sites and radio equipment

• Spectrum currently in use

• Switching, core-network and data-centre facilities

• International gateways and cable landing stations

• Site power and fuel arrangements

• Government, operator and privately controlled assets

• Existing rights of way

• Coverage, capacity and quality

• Critical single points of failure

• Planned or contracted investments

This exercise should distinguish between the existence of an asset and its usable capacity. A fibre route may appear on a network map but have damaged sections, limited equipment, inadequate maintenance, disputed control or no practical access for competing operators.

Similarly, subscriber numbers can exaggerate effective connectivity. Multiple SIM ownership, inactive accounts and the use of several operators to compensate for inconsistent coverage make headline connection figures an unreliable measure of digital inclusion.

The baseline should consequently combine documentation with technical testing, physical inspection, network-performance data and geographically verified asset information.

Only then can Yemen decide what to repair, replace, share, bypass or retire.

Layer one: resilient international connectivity

Every domestic network ultimately depends on international capacity. Yemen cannot build a functioning digital economy if access to the global internet depends on a small number of vulnerable routes, institutions or landing points.

Submarine cables remain essential

Satellite systems have transformed the range of available connectivity options, but they do not remove the need for submarine cables. Fibre-optic submarine systems continue to provide the large-scale capacity and attractive unit economics required for national internet traffic, cloud services, business connectivity and future data growth.

Yemen is connected to international cable systems including AAE-1, which links Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe and has a Yemen landing point. The AAE-1 consortium describes a system extending approximately 25,000 kilometres and using high-capacity optical transmission across its route.

Aden is also connected to Djibouti by a dedicated submarine system. Other cable routes and landing points around Yemen and the wider Red Sea add potential capacity, but physical connection alone does not guarantee resilience. What matters is whether traffic can genuinely be transferred between independent systems, landing points, backhaul routes and international providers.

The 2024 Red Sea cable disruptions illustrated the problem. Damage affected several regional systems, while the repair process was complicated by security conditions and disputes over permits and authority. Later analysis concluded that authorisation to repair AAE-1 required prolonged negotiation involving Yemen’s competing authorities.

This demonstrates that cable resilience is not merely an engineering issue. It depends on:

• Landing-station security

• Repair permits

• Access to territorial waters

• Relationships with cable consortia

• Availability of specialist vessels

• Domestic backhaul

• Commercial agreements

• Cooperation between authorities

• The ability to reroute traffic quickly

A country may be connected to several cables and still have a significant common point of failure.

Yemen needs genuine route diversity

International resilience should be assessed end to end.

Two cables landing at the same location and using the same terrestrial backhaul are not fully diverse. Two international services controlled through the same gateway are not institutionally diverse. Capacity bought from several suppliers may still converge on the same vulnerable regional route.

Yemen should aim to establish at least three independently usable forms of international access:

1. High-capacity submarine routes serving different landing locations

2. Terrestrial cross-border connectivity where politically and commercially feasible

3. Satellite capacity capable of supporting priority services and temporary traffic restoration

A longer-term plan could include additional cable landings or branches, particularly where they reinforce major economic areas and avoid existing points of concentration. However, new cable infrastructure should only proceed after confirming the availability of secure landing facilities, competitive backhaul and clear governance.

Otherwise, Yemen could spend heavily on an international cable while preserving a domestic monopoly bottleneck between the landing station and the rest of the country.

Create strategic international capacity

Yemen should not attempt to reserve enough satellite or alternative capacity to replace all international traffic indefinitely. That would be unnecessarily expensive.

It should instead identify priority traffic that must survive a major cable interruption:

• Emergency communications

• Government continuity

• Banking and payment systems

• Hospitals and health networks

• Airports and ports

• Humanitarian organisations

• Operator control and signalling

• Cybersecurity coordination

• Essential business and public internet access

Pre-negotiated arrangements should allow this traffic to move rapidly onto alternative routes. Resilience capacity must be contracted, configured and tested before an emergency. A theoretical backup route that requires several weeks of commercial negotiation is not an operational backup.

Layer two: a shared national backbone

International capacity is only useful if it can be transported reliably across Yemen.

The national backbone should connect the principal population centres, cable landing points, mobile networks, data centres, ports, airports, public institutions and regional aggregation points. Its design must recognise Yemen’s difficult terrain and the operational risks associated with long linear routes.

Fibre should form the core

Fibre provides the capacity Yemen will need for mobile backhaul, government networks, enterprise services, cloud access and future broadband growth. It should therefore form the core of the national transport architecture.

But the goal should not be to run fibre everywhere immediately.

Priority routes should include:

• Connections between the main international landing points and gateways

• Aden and other major southern cities

• Sana’a and major northern population centres

• The principal east-west and north-south economic corridors

• Ports, airports and logistics facilities

• Mobile-network aggregation sites

• Universities, hospitals and government facilities

• Regional centres from which rural coverage can be extended

Existing utility, road, railway, energy and pipeline corridors should be examined for shared ducts and rights of way. Coordinating fibre construction with other civil works can reduce cost substantially. Conversely, repeatedly excavating the same routes for different government bodies and operators would waste scarce reconstruction capital.

Microwave remains strategically important

Microwave is sometimes treated as an inferior legacy technology that should disappear as fibre expands. That would be a mistake in Yemen.

Modern microwave links can be deployed more rapidly than fibre, cross difficult terrain and provide substantial capacity. They are valuable for:

• Restoring damaged backbone sections

• Connecting mobile sites

• Reaching mountainous communities

• Providing route diversity

• Serving areas where civil works are unsafe or uneconomic

• Creating temporary links while fibre is built

• Bypassing damaged or politically inaccessible infrastructure

Microwave should be integrated deliberately into the architecture rather than used only as an emergency workaround.

Routes must nevertheless be planned carefully. Multiple links that share the same tower, power supply or access road may fail together. Resilience requires physical as well as radio-path diversity.

The backbone should operate as shared infrastructure

Yemen is unlikely to benefit from every mobile operator building an entirely separate national transport network. The economics are particularly weak outside major urban areas.

A more efficient model would give licensed operators and service providers access to backbone capacity on transparent, non-discriminatory terms. This could involve:

• A structurally separated wholesale network

• Open-access obligations applied to state-owned infrastructure

• Regional neutral-host providers

• Public-private infrastructure concessions

• Joint ventures between operators

• Capacity swaps between independently owned routes

The correct ownership structure requires further analysis. The essential principle is clearer: control of an indispensable fibre route or landing station must not allow one institution or operator to prevent effective competition.

Public or development finance should be conditional on open-access arrangements, measurable service levels and transparent wholesale pricing.

Layer three: mobile as the national access network

For most Yemenis, mobile will remain the principal means of reaching the internet. The near-term access strategy should therefore concentrate on improving 4G availability, capacity and affordability.

Prioritise effective 4G before national 5G

5G will eventually have a role in Yemen, particularly for high-capacity urban areas, industrial facilities, ports, fixed wireless access and specialised enterprise applications.

But a national race towards 5G would misallocate capital while basic broadband remains inconsistent.

The immediate priorities should be:

• Expanding 4G coverage

• Increasing capacity in congested areas

• Modernising radio and core networks

• Improving backhaul

• Refarming suitable spectrum

• Reducing dropped connections and outages

• Enabling affordable smartphones and data packages

• Improving interoperability between networks

• Extending coverage along important transport corridors

A 4G network with adequate backhaul, stable power and sufficient spectrum will provide more practical value than a limited 5G deployment attached to fragile supporting infrastructure.

This does not mean freezing the architecture at 4G. Core networks, fibre, data centres and spectrum plans should be designed to support later 5G introduction. Yemen should build a migration path rather than pursue a premature launch target.

Spectrum must match geography and economics

Lower-frequency spectrum can provide wide-area coverage and better building penetration, reducing the number of sites required in rural areas. Higher frequencies add capacity in towns and cities.

A reconstruction spectrum plan should therefore consider:

• Current assignments and actual use

• Conflicting claims created during the war

• Interference between networks

• Technology-neutral licensing

• Spectrum refarming

• Rural coverage bands

• Capacity bands for urban centres

• Spectrum for fixed wireless access

• Emergency and public-safety requirements

• Cross-border coordination

• Future non-terrestrial integration

Spectrum fees should not be designed primarily to maximise immediate government revenue. Excessive licence and spectrum costs ultimately reduce investment, coverage and affordability.

Coverage commitments, infrastructure sharing and service-quality obligations may be more valuable to Yemen than large upfront auction receipts.

Infrastructure sharing should become the norm

Tower construction, site security, energy systems and backhaul account for a substantial proportion of network cost. Sharing these assets can release capital for coverage and service improvements.

Passive sharing should cover:

• Towers and masts

• Compounds

• Power systems

• Shelters

• Security

• Access roads

• Ducts and fibre

• Rooftops and public buildings

In rural or strategically important areas, active sharing or a neutral-host radio network may also be justified.

The model must preserve appropriate retail competition. Consumers benefit when operators compete on service, price and innovation; they gain little from the expensive duplication of towers in profitable districts while remote communities remain unserved.

Layer four: targeted fixed broadband

Fibre-to-the-premises should be part of Yemen’s future, but it should not initially be treated as a universal access solution.

The strongest early cases are likely to include:

• Government and municipal buildings

• Hospitals and healthcare clusters

• Universities and schools

• Banks and payment providers

• Ports and logistics areas

• Larger businesses

• Industrial and commercial zones

• Dense, higher-income urban developments

• Mobile base stations

• Data centres and cloud facilities

Connecting these locations creates anchor demand around which wider networks can develop.

Where direct fibre is not economically viable, fixed wireless access can provide a faster and less capital-intensive alternative. 4G and later 5G fixed wireless services can support households, small businesses and public institutions, provided sufficient spectrum and backhaul are available.

Community Wi-Fi and local access providers may also have a role. A wholesale fibre or satellite connection can serve a village, market or neighbourhood through locally managed distribution. This approach should be regulated sufficiently to protect users and network security without imposing licensing requirements that make small-scale provision impossible.

Layer five: satellite as an integrated component

Satellite connectivity is no longer merely a last-resort service for government compounds or specialist organisations.

Low Earth orbit systems can provide comparatively high-speed access with lower latency than traditional geostationary satellite services. They can be installed quickly and operate independently of much of the terrestrial network.

Starlink began offering an officially approved service in areas under Yemen’s internationally recognised government in 2024. Yemen’s Public Telecommunications Corporation now presents itself as an official local agent for the service.

Its emergence has demonstrated genuine demand for alternatives to unreliable or unavailable terrestrial broadband. It has also highlighted affordability, jurisdiction, security and digital-sovereignty questions. In areas controlled by the Sana’a authorities, the service has faced prohibition and confiscation orders, illustrating how technology availability remains inseparable from Yemen’s political division.

Satellite should be incorporated into national planning in four roles.

1. Remote access

Satellite can connect isolated communities, islands, agricultural areas, clinics and schools that are unlikely to receive terrestrial broadband in the near term.

The terminal should not always be treated as a connection for one household. Shared community access can spread the cost across many users.

2. Network backhaul

Operators and local service providers can use satellite to connect mobile or Wi-Fi access networks where fibre and microwave are unavailable.

This converts one satellite connection into a broader local service.

3. Emergency restoration

Portable terminals can restore communications after cable damage, natural disasters, local conflict or major equipment failure.

Terminals, power systems and activation procedures should be pre-positioned for critical users rather than procured after an incident.

4. Competitive pressure

Alternative satellite services can reduce dependence on terrestrial bottlenecks and encourage existing providers to improve quality and pricing.

However, Yemen should avoid replacing dependence on one domestic gateway with dependence on a single foreign satellite company. A technology-neutral licensing framework should permit multiple compliant providers where feasible.

It should address:

• Service authorisation

• Terminal importation

• Spectrum coordination

• Lawful access arrangements

• User privacy

• Cybersecurity

• Consumer protection

• Taxation

• Competition

• Service continuity

• Government use during emergencies

The objective should be regulated diversity—not unrestricted operation or an exclusive national arrangement.

The longer-term role of HAPS and other non-terrestrial networks

High-altitude platform systems, sometimes described as towers in the sky, could eventually supplement Yemen’s terrestrial and satellite networks.

Operating in the stratosphere, HAPS may be capable of providing coverage across large areas using telecommunications payloads closer to users than satellites. Potential Yemeni applications could include:

• Temporary mobile coverage

• Disaster and emergency communications

• Border and maritime areas

• Rural broadband

• Restoration after terrestrial outages

• Coverage around critical economic corridors

• Environmental and infrastructure monitoring

However, HAPS should not yet be presented as a substitute for national mobile or fibre infrastructure. Commercial models, aircraft availability, payload integration, spectrum, operating permissions, ground systems and service economics require careful evaluation.

Yemen’s architecture should remain open to HAPS without making its near-term reconstruction dependent upon it.

A sensible approach would identify possible use cases, spectrum requirements and trial locations while prioritising technologies already available at scale.

Power is part of the communications architecture

A network without reliable energy is not resilient.

Yemen’s electricity shortages mean that many telecommunications sites depend heavily on diesel generators, batteries and local power arrangements. Fuel is expensive to transport, vulnerable to disruption and exposed to theft or diversion. Generator maintenance also adds significant operating cost.

Every reconstruction programme should therefore treat power as part of the network design.

Site solutions may combine:

• Solar generation

• Modern battery storage

• Efficient radio equipment

• Intelligent energy management

• Generator backup

• Remote monitoring

• Shared power systems

• Community energy arrangements

The appropriate design will vary by site. A major data centre, urban rooftop, remote tower and village access point have very different requirements.

Energy systems should also be sized for realistic operating conditions, including dust, heat, battery degradation, maintenance capability and equipment security. Installing solar panels without funding cleaning, spares, monitoring and lifecycle replacement will produce only temporary benefits.

The next article in this series examines the telecom-energy relationship in detail.

Cybersecurity and physical resilience by design

Yemen’s future architecture will be increasingly software-controlled and connected to international platforms. This improves flexibility but expands the potential attack surface.

Security requirements should include:

• Segmentation of critical networks

• Redundant network-control facilities

• Secure identity and access management

• Protection of signalling systems

• Supply-chain and equipment assurance

• Software-patching arrangements

• Distributed data backups

• National incident coordination

• Protection against denial-of-service attacks

• Security requirements for shared infrastructure

• Physical protection of cable routes and landing stations

Centralisation creates efficiency but can also create catastrophic failure points. Core-network functions, international gateways and essential databases should have geographically separated recovery arrangements.

Yemen should not attempt to create complete digital sovereignty by hosting and manufacturing everything domestically. That is neither realistic nor economically efficient. It should instead identify the functions and information that require national control, while using diverse international suppliers and interoperable standards to avoid excessive dependence.

A phased investment sequence

A credible architecture needs a sequence. Attempting to build every layer simultaneously would overwhelm institutional and financial capacity.

Phase 1: stabilise and map — first 12 months

Priorities should include:

• Complete the verified infrastructure baseline

• Identify critical single points of failure

• Protect existing international links

• Establish emergency satellite capacity

• Restore priority backbone and mobile sites

• Improve power at critical facilities

• Agree interim infrastructure-sharing rules

• Freeze uncoordinated changes to strategic spectrum

• Establish common outage and performance reporting

This phase is about visibility, continuity and urgent risk reduction.

Phase 2: connect and diversify — years one to three

The second phase should:

• Create diverse international routes

• Expand open-access national backbone capacity

• Modernise 4G networks

• Extend coverage along economic corridors

• Connect public-service anchor institutions

• Deploy neutral-host infrastructure in underserved areas

• Introduce competitive wholesale access

• Expand renewable-powered sites

• Establish regional data and interconnection facilities

• Regularise satellite licensing and shared-access models

This is the principal reconstruction period.

Phase 3: scale and modernise — years three to seven

Once the foundations are stronger, Yemen can:

• Extend fibre access in viable urban areas

• Introduce targeted 5G services

• Refarm spectrum more comprehensively

• Develop local cloud and data-centre capacity

• Expand rural connectivity programmes

• Trial HAPS or other non-terrestrial systems

• Improve cross-border and regional connectivity

• Support advanced digital government and industry applications

The transition between phases should depend on operational readiness rather than fixed political announcements.

What should not be built

Reconstruction programmes often attract ambitious projects because large, visible infrastructure is easier to announce than institutional reform or maintenance.

Yemen should be cautious of:

A single national network controlled by one interested party

Integration can create efficiency, but monopoly control over backbones, gateways or shared infrastructure can suppress competition and investment.

Nationwide fibre-to-the-home before demand is established

Universal fibre may sound transformative, but the cost and execution risk would be difficult to justify while mobile broadband and basic backbone capacity remain inadequate.

A prestige-led national 5G rollout

5G should address demonstrable capacity or industry needs. It should not divert investment from power, backhaul and 4G coverage.

Satellite exclusivity

Satellite can improve resilience only if it adds diversity. Exclusive dependency on one provider creates a different strategic vulnerability.

Infrastructure without maintenance funding

Capital budgets attract attention; operating budgets determine whether networks remain functional. Every investment should include skills, spares, software, power and lifecycle costs.

Parallel donor networks

Public bodies and development organisations may be tempted to build standalone networks for individual programmes. Where security allows, investment should strengthen shared national infrastructure rather than create disconnected technical islands.

The boardroom and policy questions

Decision-makers evaluating Yemen’s connectivity reconstruction should ask:

• Which services must remain available during a major national disruption?

• Where are the genuine international and domestic single points of failure?

• Which existing assets can be repaired, and which should be replaced?

• Who controls access to landing stations, fibre routes and gateway capacity?

• Can competing operators obtain wholesale capacity on equal terms?

• Is route diversity physical, commercial and institutional—or merely apparent?

• Which areas justify fibre, and where are mobile, microwave or satellite more appropriate?

• What level of 4G quality should Yemen achieve before substantial 5G investment?

• Which public institutions can provide anchor demand?

• How should satellite services be licensed without creating exclusivity?

• Where would neutral-host infrastructure improve investment viability?

• How will site power be funded and maintained?

• What conditions should accompany donor or development-finance investment?

• Who will maintain the assets after the construction programme ends?

• How will the network evolve as Yemen’s institutions are gradually reunited?

These questions should be answered before major procurement begins. Otherwise, Yemen risks buying individual technologies without building a coherent national system.

Conclusion: build a network that can bend without breaking

Yemen’s future connectivity architecture should not be based on the assumption that every institution, route and power supply will function continuously.

It must be designed for interruption.

Submarine cables will remain the foundation of international capacity, but they need alternative landing points, domestic backhaul and emergency satellite support. Fibre should carry the national network’s highest volumes, while microwave provides reach, speed of deployment and diversity. Mobile—principally well-designed 4G—should remain the mass-market access layer. Fixed wireless, community networks and satellite should fill gaps that conventional mobile and fibre cannot address economically.

Over time, fibre access, 5G, HAPS and more advanced digital infrastructure can be added. But they must rest on functioning foundations: power, backhaul, spectrum, open access, maintenance and credible governance.

The strongest architecture will not necessarily be the one with the most fibre, the newest radio technology or the largest single investment programme. It will be the one that continues to provide useful services when a cable is cut, a power system fails, a route becomes inaccessible or an institution is unable to act.

That is the meaning of progressive resilience: remove the most dangerous dependencies first, create multiple ways to connect, and allow capacity to grow alongside economic demand and institutional capability.

Yemen has an opportunity to avoid recreating the weaknesses of its former telecommunications model. It can build an architecture that is more open, distributed, energy-efficient and resilient—while using mobile and digital infrastructure to connect its people and enable wider national recovery.

How Bridge Connect can help: Bridge Connect advises governments, operators, investors and development partners on telecommunications strategy, infrastructure resilience and market development.

For Yemen, this could include national connectivity architecture, infrastructure and dependency mapping, operator and stakeholder analysis, technology-option assessment, investment sequencing, market-entry support and the development of practical programmes covering fibre, mobile, satellite, HAPS and critical-infrastructure resilience.

Next in the series: Powering the Network—Why Yemen’s Telecom Recovery Is Really an Energy Strategy.