Trust But Verify – Vendor Audits, Compliance and Kill Switches

Introduction: Trust Alone Is Not a Strategy

Telecom networks are built on partnerships. Operators don’t manufacture base stations, write all their own code, or lay their own submarine cables. Instead, they rely on vendors—often foreign, often opaque, always critical.

But in an era of escalating cyber conflict, disinformation, and geopolitical tension, blind trust in vendors is no longer viable. Boards and regulators must move from faith-based procurement to evidence-based assurance.

This blog explores how telecoms can verify vendor integrity through audits, enforceable compliance mechanisms, and—when all else fails—network kill switches that ensure control can be reclaimed.

The Vendor Risk Landscape in Telecoms

Telecom vendors provide the physical and digital infrastructure that powers modern society. Key categories include:

• RAN equipment suppliers (e.g. Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei)

• Core network vendors (e.g. Cisco, Juniper, HPE)

• OSS/BSS and orchestration platforms (e.g. Amdocs, Netcracker)

• Cloud partners and hyperscalers (e.g. AWS, Azure, Red Hat)

• System integrators and managed service providers

Each plays a vital role. And each could—knowingly or unknowingly—introduce vulnerabilities into your network.

Risks include:

• Embedded backdoors or insecure code

• Compromised firmware or software updates

• Remote access channels abused by insiders or state actors

• Supply chain subversion from component vendors

• Policy changes in vendor home countries altering control dynamics

“Trust But Verify”: The New Default

The Cold War mantra is now telecom doctrine: trust, but verify.

Telecom boards must assume that any vendor could be compromised—not because they are malicious, but because compromise is often systemic, hidden, and emergent.

Verification comes in three forms:

1. Security Audits

2. Compliance Mechanisms

3. Fail-safe Controls (Kill Switches)

1. Vendor Security Audits: Lifting the Hood

What to Audit

Audit Category	Focus Area
Firmware & Software	Backdoors, default credentials, insecure APIs
Supply Chain	Component provenance, subcontractors, update paths
Remote Access Policies	Ports, credentials, vendor support procedures
Data Flow & Logging	Transparency of diagnostic telemetry and call-home
Change Management	How patches and upgrades are developed and deployed

Best Practices

• Use independent third-party labsAvoid audits that rely on vendor-supplied evidence alone.

• Include source code access (where feasible)Especially for critical functions like encryption, update mechanisms, and provisioning.

• Conduct on-site inspectionsFor hardware assembly facilities, development centres, and testing labs.

• Establish continuous audit schedulesNot a one-time event—make audits an annual or biannual requirement.

• Demand red team validationAllow ethical hacking of deployed solutions to verify vendor security claims.

Audit Challenges

• Vendors may resist full transparency citing IP protection.

• Cross-border legal frameworks may prevent export of source code or audit tools.

• Smaller vendors may lack security maturity or documentation.

Your response: If they can’t pass the audit, they don’t make it into the network.

2. Compliance Mechanisms: Contracts That Control

Security isn’t just technical—it’s legal and contractual. Operators must hardwire security obligations into procurement and SLA documents.

Essential Clauses

• Vulnerability Disclosure ObligationsVendors must inform operators of any discovered or suspected vulnerabilities within 24–72 hours.

• Update Signing and VerificationAll software or firmware updates must be cryptographically signed and verified before deployment.

• Audit Cooperation ClausesVendors must agree to annual security audits by a qualified third party.

• Geopolitical Change NotificationVendors must inform operators of any change in ownership, legal structure, or domicile that affects risk profile.

• Remote Access GovernanceAll remote access must be logged, time-bound, and approved per session.

• Kill Switch Cooperation (see below)Vendors must support implementation of network control disengagement if national security conditions arise.

Certifications and Benchmarks

• ISO/IEC 27001 and 28000 (information security and supply chain)

• GSMA NESAS (Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme)

• Common Criteria (for equipment and software assurance)

• OpenChain (for open-source component assurance)

3. Kill Switches: The Ultimate Fail-safe

What if a vendor refuses an audit? Or a legal regime change in their home country threatens your infrastructure? Or malware is discovered too late?

In such scenarios, operators and governments must retain control over their infrastructure.

What Is a Telecom Kill Switch?

A kill switch is a pre-installed mechanism that allows the operator or government to:

• Disable remote vendor access

• Block specific vendor modules or software functions

• Revert to last-known-good firmware

• Isolate suspect nodes from the broader network

• Lock down control planes and admin interfaces

It’s not about destroying equipment. It’s about regaining sovereignty over compromised systems.

Implementation Strategies

• Isolation of Vendor ModulesSegment networks so that compromised vendor gear can be deactivated without total outage.

• Independent Update GatekeepersUse trusted third-party systems to verify and approve all vendor updates.

• Hardware Root of TrustSecure boot processes ensure only verified firmware can be executed.

• Pre-staged Recovery ImagesClean system states stored on-device or in secure vaults allow rapid rollback.

• Manual Override ProceduresPhysical access or air-gapped tools that allow last-resort reconfiguration.

Case Studies: When Kill Switches Could Have Helped

Huawei in the UK

In 2020, UK operators were told to rip and replace Huawei RAN gear. With no kill switches in place, this became a costly multi-year process requiring full physical swap-outs.

SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack

Had customers implemented strict update verification and kill switch capability, the impact of this global software supply chain breach could have been dramatically reduced.

Russia's SORM Compliance

Foreign operators entering Russia had to comply with surveillance backdoors. Some were later forced to disconnect or exit entirely when controls couldn’t be severed.

Government’s Role in Vendor Oversight

Operators alone cannot manage systemic risk from foreign vendors. Governments must:

• Create national vendor assurance programs

• Maintain certification regimes for telecom hardware and software

• Establish crisis communication protocols with operators

• Provide shared testing and audit facilities for vendor inspection

• Draft emergency legislation to facilitate vendor disengagement if necessary

In the UK, the Telecoms Security Act (2021) empowers the government to intervene directly in vendor deployment decisions based on national security grounds.

What Boards and Executives Must Demand

1. Vendor Security Risk RegisterMaintain a dynamic, continuously updated view of supplier risks.

2. Annual Audit and Assurance PlanBudget and schedule regular reviews for high-impact vendor assets.

3. Incident Response IntegrationEnsure vendor compromise scenarios are built into business continuity planning.

4. Exit Strategy for Strategic VendorsKnow how to remove or replace critical vendors—before you have to.

5. Cyber Insurance with Vendor ClausesEnsure policies account for vendor-related breaches and mitigation costs.

Conclusion: If You Can’t Control It, You Don’t Own It

Telecom operators don’t just need reliable vendors—they need verifiable ones. Trust must be earned, tested, and retained under scrutiny. Compliance must be codified, monitored, and enforced. Kill switches must be designed, implemented, and never needed—until they are.

The future of telecom infrastructure is dynamic, distributed, and digital. But without control, there is no resilience. And without resilience, there is no security.

Trust. But verify. And be ready to disconnect.