The Insider Risk – Rogue Employees and Compromised Engineers

Introduction: When the Threat Comes from Within

Every telecom operator has firewalls, encryption protocols, and cybersecurity teams guarding their perimeter. But what happens when the threat is already inside?

Insider threats—rogue employees, negligent engineers, or compromised contractors—remain one of the most difficult risks to detect, deter, and manage. In an industry where access equals power, a single privileged individual can compromise millions of users, disable networks, or quietly siphon data for years.

This blog explores the insider threat in telecoms: how it happens, why it’s often missed, and what boards and CISOs can do to turn one of their greatest liabilities—trusted people—into a pillar of resilience.

Why Telecoms Are Particularly Vulnerable

Unlike many sectors, telecoms involves:

• Highly privileged access to infrastructure and subscriber data

• Long-tenured staff with deep knowledge of legacy systems

• Extensive outsourcing and vendor integration

• Global operations involving multiple jurisdictions and cultural norms

• Decentralised teams spread across network operations centres, field support, customer service, and IT

This creates the perfect storm for insider risk:

• Technical access is widespread

• Oversight is fragmented

• Motives vary and are hard to detect

Types of Insider Threats in Telecoms

Threat Type	Description
Malicious Insider	An employee or contractor intentionally harming the organisation
Compromised Insider	A staff member coerced or manipulated by an external actor
Negligent Insider	Poor security practices or accidental breaches by otherwise loyal staff
Outsourced Insider	Third-party vendor staff with excessive or unsupervised access
Departing Employee	Exiting staff sabotaging systems or exfiltrating data

Real-World Examples: The Insider Threat in Action

1. Engineer Spying on Ex-Girlfriend

In the US, a telecom engineer was caught using internal tools to track his ex-partner's phone location, accessing call logs without authorisation over several months.

2. Billing Fraud Rings

In multiple African and South Asian markets, telecom insiders have been implicated in syndicates that create ghost SIMs, manipulate billing records, and redirect international traffic for grey-market termination.

3. Syria and Authoritarian Access

Telecom employees in Syria and Iran have been coerced into providing data on activists or opposition figures—including call records, location data, and SMS logs.

4. Data Leaks via CRM Access

A Southeast Asian mobile operator discovered a staff member had been exporting high-value enterprise customer records and reselling them to a rival firm.

How Insiders Exploit Their Access

• Override provisioning systems to activate/deactivate SIMs

• Edit OSS/BSS records to conceal or modify traffic patterns

• Manipulate lawful intercept systems to reroute surveillance

• Exfiltrate CDRs, KYC documents, or subscriber databases

• Create shadow admin accounts or backdoor credentials

• Install unauthorised tools or scripts on internal servers

• Abuse software-defined networks (SDN) to dynamically redirect traffic

Insiders often have legitimate access, making it extremely difficult to distinguish malicious behaviour from normal operations—especially when audit trails are weak or fragmented.

The Motivations Behind Insider Threats

1. Financial GainFraud schemes, SIM boxing, or stolen data monetisation

2. Ideological BeliefsPolitical activism, whistleblowing, or sabotage against employer

3. Coercion or BlackmailEspecially in authoritarian regimes or among migrant workforces

4. Revenge or ResentmentTriggered by job loss, demotion, or workplace conflict

5. EspionageCovert recruitment by foreign intelligence services or rival operators

Why Detection Is So Difficult

• Insiders know how systems work—and how to hide their actions

• Logs may be deleted or altered if auditing is not robust

• Behavioural red flags are often ignored by non-technical management

• Outsourced staff fall outside internal HR oversight

• Access control models may be outdated or loosely enforced

Insider threats are asymmetric—a low-cost actor with high-level access can inflict damage far beyond what an external hacker could achieve.

Building an Insider Risk Mitigation Programme

1. Establish a Zero Trust Framework

• Trust no user by default—require continuous authentication and role-based access

• Segment networks and apply least privilege principles across all systems

2. Implement Privileged Access Management (PAM)

• Log, monitor, and approve all elevated access sessions

• Enforce time-bound credentials and just-in-time access models

3. Monitor for Behavioural Anomalies

• Use User and Entity Behaviour Analytics (UEBA) to detect deviations from baseline activity

• Flag actions like bulk data exports, late-night access, or changes from unfamiliar locations

4. Vet Third-Party and Contractor Access

• Extend background checks and onboarding standards to vendor staff

• Require NDA and code-of-conduct training for all with system access

5. Build a Culture of Security

• Train staff on security hygiene and reporting suspicious behaviour

• Encourage whistleblowing and ensure non-retaliation policies

6. Secure Offboarding Procedures

• Immediately revoke credentials and disable accounts of departing staff

• Review recent access activity and escalate any anomalies

7. Automate and Encrypt Audit Logs

• Use tamper-evident storage for audit records

• Ensure all critical system interactions are logged and independently monitored

Governance and Board-Level Responsibilities

Boards must treat insider threats not as IT issues, but as organisational risk affecting:

• Reputation – a single breach can destroy trust in network integrity

• Revenue – internal fraud, identity theft, and customer churn

• Compliance – data protection regulations (e.g. GDPR, CCPA) require strong access controls

• National Security – where telecom infrastructure is designated critical

Governance Checklist:

• Does your organisation have an insider threat programme?

• Are risks from contractors and third-party vendors included?

• Are you receiving regular briefings on privileged access abuse trends?

• Is there budget for PAM, UEBA, and forensic audit tooling?

Conclusion: People Are the New Perimeter

As telecoms move from physical networks to virtualised, software-defined architectures, technical perimeters become porous—and human access becomes the real risk frontier.

Insiders don’t need to hack firewalls. They bypass them—with admin logins, badge access, or remote credentials. They don’t need to steal passwords—they write the scripts. They don’t get flagged—because their behaviour looks like part of the job.

Managing insider risk is not about surveillance—it’s about governance, culture, and trust with accountability.

In an era where one rogue engineer can quietly cripple an entire network, the question is no longer if you’ll face an insider incident. It’s whether you’ll detect it in time.