State Surveillance via Telecom Infrastructure – Myth or Mechanism?

Introduction: When Networks Become Listening Posts

Telecom networks were built to connect people, not monitor them. Yet from the early days of telegraphy to today’s 5G cores, the line between communications and surveillance has always been a thin one.

In recent years, headlines have been dominated by spyware like Pegasus, or disputes over vendors like Huawei. But what often goes unspoken is the systemic vulnerability of telecom infrastructure to exploitation—not just by rogue actors or hackers, but by governments themselves.

Sometimes this access is legal. Often, it is not. And in many cases, the line between the two is blurred beyond recognition.

This blog explores how state surveillance via telecoms actually works—technically, legally, and politically—and why the infrastructure itself has become a key battleground in the fight over digital sovereignty and human rights.

The Two Faces of Telecom Surveillance

There are two primary types of state surveillance involving telecom infrastructure:

1. Lawful Intercept (LI)

Governments compel telecom operators to provide access to call data, metadata, or content under a legal framework (e.g. via court orders or national security laws).

2. Covert Access (CA)

Governments—or foreign intelligence agencies—bypass operators entirely by exploiting infrastructure:

• Backdoors in vendor hardware or software

• Undocumented features in signalling protocols

• Passive monitoring at switching or landing points

• Exploitation of core network elements and control planes

Lawful doesn’t always mean ethical. And covert doesn’t always mean unauthorised. The interplay of these two models defines today’s surveillance debate.

Legal Surveillance: The Frameworks That Make It Possible

Most countries have some form of legal basis for intercepting telecom traffic. Key examples include:

• United Kingdom – Investigatory Powers Act 2016 ("Snooper’s Charter")

• United States – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Section 702

• China – National Intelligence Law (Article 7)

• Russia – System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM)

• Germany – G10 Law and BND Law

• France – Law on Intelligence (Loi Renseignement)

These laws typically grant:

• Access to call records and SMS metadata

• Real-time interception of content under warrant

• Compelled decryption of encrypted messages (where technically feasible)

• Installation of surveillance devices or software on operator infrastructure

Telecoms firms are legally obliged to cooperate—but are often gagged from disclosing the extent of surveillance operations.

From Legal to Covert: The Grey Zone

Problems arise when governments:

• Exploit legal intercept systems for mass surveillance rather than targeted access

• Use foreign or proxy intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance beyond jurisdictional constraints

• Insert covert access tools during equipment procurement or supply chain integration

• Establish ‘black boxes’ in telecom facilities with no third-party oversight

This is where infrastructure becomes weaponised—not by criminal actors, but by the very institutions entrusted with protecting it.

Case Study 1: The NSA and PRISM/Upstream

Revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013, the NSA’s PRISM and Upstream programs showed how deeply integrated surveillance had become within global telecom flows:

• PRISM: Gained access to data from tech companies and cloud platforms

• Upstream: Tapped into fibre optic cables and backbone networks, capturing voice and data traffic as it transited across US-controlled infrastructure

By targeting international peering points, the NSA could access foreign-to-foreign communications that merely passed through US territory—a key loophole in global data protection frameworks.

Case Study 2: Russia’s SORM Programme

Russia’s SORM framework requires all telecom operators to install special devices—controlled by the FSB—on their networks. These allow:

• Real-time interception of communications

• Monitoring of call metadata, location, and browsing history

• Collection of user identities linked to SIM registration and web activity

Operators have no legal recourse and are forbidden from disclosing surveillance cooperation. Equipment costs are borne by the operator, effectively making them a state surveillance partner.

Case Study 3: Huawei and Alleged State Access

Huawei has repeatedly denied allegations of backdoors or state-sponsored espionage. However, the concern from Western governments has centred less on proven misconduct and more on:

• The legal obligation of Chinese firms to cooperate with state intelligence

• The opacity of Huawei’s software and update systems

• The risk of dormant capabilities embedded in network gear

The UK’s Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) noted consistent engineering flaws and lack of internal discipline—not proof of espionage, but a high-risk security posture.

Surveillance via Protocols: SS7, Diameter and Beyond

Even without cooperation from vendors or operators, surveillance can exploit telecom signalling protocols:

• SS7: The legacy protocol used for call setup and SMS remains widely used and poorly secured. Exploits include location tracking, call interception, and identity spoofing.

• Diameter: The newer protocol used in 4G/5G also has weaknesses, particularly when international roaming allows foreign networks to send signalling requests across borders.

Spyware vendors and intelligence agencies routinely buy access to these protocols to conduct surveillance—especially in high-risk countries.

Infrastructure Control Points: Where Surveillance Happens

Governments and intelligence agencies can exploit multiple layers:

Layer	Surveillance Point	Risk
Physical Layer	Submarine cable landing stations	Mass data capture
Transport Layer	Internet exchange points (IXPs)	Packet inspection
Network Layer	Core routers and switches	Passive monitoring, traffic shaping
Application Layer	IMS, billing, and messaging platforms	Data exfiltration, SIM manipulation
Management Layer	Remote diagnostic systems, vendor backdoors	Persistent covert access

Each layer adds a new path for state surveillance—some legal, some not, all significant.

The Business Implications of State Surveillance

Telecom executives and board members often underestimate the business impact of surveillance exposure:

• Regulatory Sanctions: Failure to prevent illicit access can lead to fines or licence revocation

• Loss of Customer Trust: Enterprise clients may abandon providers perceived as compromised

• Litigation Risk: Surveillance programs can trigger class-action lawsuits or data privacy challenges

• International Tension: Network involvement in foreign surveillance may complicate cross-border operations

• Investor Scrutiny: ESG frameworks now consider data ethics and privacy resilience as part of governance evaluation

In an era where data integrity is a competitive advantage, perceived collusion with surveillance regimes can destroy shareholder value.

What Operators and Boards Should Do

1. Know Your Legal ObligationsStay current with domestic surveillance laws and your responsibilities under them.

2. Isolate Surveillance InterfacesEnsure lawful intercept systems are segregated from the core network and have strict logging, access control, and auditing.

3. Limit Vendor AccessReview SLAs and MSA clauses that permit vendors to remotely access infrastructure. Require full logging, restricted access, and audit rights.

4. Assess Political Risk of VendorsEvaluate whether suppliers are subject to foreign intelligence laws or geopolitical influence.

5. Enhance TransparencyConsider publishing transparency reports—detailing number of lawful intercept requests and nature of data disclosed (where legally permitted).

6. Push for EncryptionDefault to end-to-end encryption where possible (e.g. for messaging platforms), even if it reduces intercept visibility.

Conclusion: Infrastructure Is Never Neutral

The idea that telecom infrastructure is apolitical has been proven false. The cables, towers, routers, and switching systems we depend on are potential vectors of surveillance—sometimes under the cover of law, sometimes not.

Telecom operators sit at the intersection of business, security, and civil liberties. And boards must understand this: you are custodians of more than a network—you are guardians of trust.

Infrastructure integrity is not just a technical goal. It is a moral and strategic imperative in a world where sovereignty, privacy, and power are increasingly mediated by who controls the wires beneath our feet.