Securing the Digital Arteries: How the FCC’s New Submarine Cable Rules Redefine Global Connectivity

Introduction – From Infrastructure to Geopolitical Asset

For decades, submarine cables have been the silent enablers of globalisation — stretching over 1.4 million kilometresbeneath the oceans, carrying 99% of the world’s internet traffic and supporting $10 trillion in daily financial transactions. They have been treated as commercial utilities: engineered for capacity, resilience, and speed, but rarely as frontline national security assets.

That era is over.

On 7 August 2025, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) unanimously approved a sweeping overhaul of its submarine cable licensing rules — the first significant change in nearly a quarter of a century. The stated aim: accelerate deployment of new undersea systems while hardening them against sabotage, espionage, and foreign interference. The unstated reality: this is a strategic counter to China’s expanding role in global undersea infrastructure.

Why Submarine Cables Are Suddenly Strategic

Cables may seem low-profile compared to satellites or data centres, but they are the physical backbone of the internet. A modern AI model, a global financial exchange, or a cloud-based enterprise platform cannot operate without them.

Yet cables are vulnerable. Threats include:

• Espionage – Interception of data at repeaters or landing stations.

• Physical sabotage – Cable cuts via anchor dragging, fishing gear, or deliberate undersea operations.

• Geopolitical mapping – Military vessels charting cable routes for potential disruption.

Recent incidents — from the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage to Baltic Sea cable cuts and Taiwan’s Matsu Islands disconnections — have shown that subsea infrastructure is not immune from hybrid warfare.

The FCC’s New Rulebook – Security Meets Speed

The reforms can be summarised as security-first modernisation:

1. Presumption of Denial for Adversary-Controlled Entities

If an applicant is owned or controlled by a “foreign adversary” (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), the default outcome is rejection — unless the applicant can prove the project poses no national security risk.

2. Ban on High-Risk Capacity Leases & Equipment

Licensees cannot lease capacity or deploy “covered” equipment from such adversaries. This effectively excludes vendors like Huawei Marine Networks (HMN Tech) and state-linked carriers from U.S.-linked projects.

3. Mandatory Cybersecurity & Physical Security Plans

Applicants must demonstrate comprehensive threat mitigation — from encryption and intrusion detection to physical site security and supply chain assurance.

4. Streamlined Licensing for Trusted Operators

U.S. and allied firms with proven security track records will see accelerated licensing, removing long administrative bottlenecks.

5. Expanded Oversight & Enforcement Powers

Annual compliance reporting is now mandatory, and the FCC can revoke licences for non-compliance or new security concerns.

The Cables at the Centre of U.S. Security Concerns

Several systems already in service or under development illustrate why this change matters:

Cable System	U.S. Landing Point	Chinese Involvement	Likely FCC Impact
Trans-Pacific Express (TPE)	Oregon	China Telecom, China Netcom, China Unicom	High risk – strong presumption of denial for upgrades or expansions
New Cross Pacific (NCP)	Oregon	China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom	Similar presumption of denial – existing licences may face stricter oversight
Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN)	Los Angeles	Initial Chinese partner (China Mobile) – later removed	Early case study of U.S. blocking adversary participation
SEA-ME-WE 6	Not U.S.-linked	Originally Huawei Marine; shifted to U.S. supplier SubCom after security objections	Shows U.S. diplomatic influence abroad

Strategic Drivers – More Than Just Cables

This is not an isolated regulatory tweak. It is part of a broader strategic doctrine:

1. Digital Decoupling – Reducing Chinese involvement in core internet infrastructure.

   
   

2. AI Infrastructure Security – Ensuring high-capacity, low-latency links for training and deploying AI remain in trusted hands.

   
   

3. Allied Supply Chain Integration – Encouraging partnerships with Japan, Australia, the UK, and the EU to create “secure corridors” for data.

   
   

4. Resilience Through Redundancy – Diversifying routes away from choke points and adversary-controlled waters.

Implications for Stakeholders

For U.S. and Allied Tech Giants

Google, Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft may benefit from faster approvals — but must comply with stringent security and reporting obligations.

For Chinese Operators

Direct involvement in new U.S.-connected cables is now effectively off the table. Expect Beijing to accelerate China-centric cable routes via Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia.

For Cable Builders and Investors

Security compliance costs will rise, but regulatory predictability could unlock capital for trusted projects, especially those linked to AI and cloud demand growth.

Looking Ahead – A New Era for the Digital Ocean

The FCC’s move is both defensive and offensive: defending the integrity of the U.S.’s digital lifelines while using regulation to shape global cable market dynamics.

As Commissioner Olivia Trusty put it, “Subsea cables are uniquely vulnerable to espionage, sabotage, and surveillance. Our global adversaries understand this.”

For telecom strategists, cable investors, and technology leaders, the message is clear: the deep ocean is now a contested domain, and control of its arteries will shape the future of connectivity, commerce, and competition.

Bridge Connect Ltd will continue to monitor the operational, investment, and geopolitical dimensions of subsea infrastructure security — because protecting these cables is no longer just an engineering challenge, it is a strategic imperative.