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Poland and Germany: Jamming Beyond the Baltics

  • Writer: Bridge Connect
    Bridge Connect
  • Jul 28
  • 5 min read

Introduction: The Threat Moves West

For years, the vulnerability of European GNSS infrastructure has been framed as a Baltic or Nordic concern—a peripheral issue at the frontier with Russia. But as the geopolitical landscape deteriorates and hybrid warfare evolves, the scope of the threat has widened. GNSS jamming and spoofing, once confined to Estonia or Kaliningrad’s immediate neighbours, is now regularly affecting Poland and Germany—two central pillars of NATO’s eastern and central European posture.

From airline diversions near Gdańsk Bay to telecoms disruptions in eastern Germany, it’s clear: Russia’s campaign of electronic interference is not limited by borders. Whether testing NATO responses, eroding trust in digital systems, or probing civil aviation networks, the extension of GNSS jamming into the airspace of core European states marks a new phase in electronic aggression.

This post analyses:

  • The current state of GNSS interference in Poland and Germany

  • Attribution and known jamming sources

  • Impacts on aviation, telecoms, and military readiness

  • Civilian infrastructure vulnerabilities

  • Response strategies and policy gaps


1. GNSS Interference Enters European Heartland

In early 2025, Eurocontrol reports showed an increase in GNSS anomaly incidents along flight corridors over Poland and eastern Germany. Notable affected areas included:

  • Gdańsk Bay, where Polish and NATO maritime patrol flights regularly operate

  • Eastern Brandenburg and Saxony, including flights into and out of Berlin Brandenburg Airport

  • Air corridors above Silesia, critical for civilian and military transport

According to GPSJam.org, which aggregates real-time GNSS interference reports from ADS-B data, the number of days with moderate-to-severe GPS disruption over Poland increased from 42 days in 2023 to 191 days in 2024. Germany, previously spared, experienced jamming anomalies on 58 separate days in 2024, mostly clustered along the Polish border and near key military infrastructure.

These are not background anomalies. They represent a measurable degradation of trusted services in two of Europe’s most connected, industrial, and strategically vital countries.


2. Attribution: Kaliningrad and Belarus as Proximate Threat Sources

Analyses by multiple defence institutes—including the UK’s RUSI and Germany’s Bundeswehr Cyber Command—have concluded that:

  • Kaliningrad Oblast continues to serve as the primary jamming origin for Poland’s north

  • Belarusian territory, particularly near Grodno and Brest, is being used for GNSS spoofing into southeastern Poland

  • Luhansk and Crimea have also reportedly broadcast strong GNSS spoofing signals affecting German-operated ISR aircraft over Romania and Moldova

Triangulation using ADS-B returns, interferometry, and direction-finding has confirmed emissions matching the GLONASS L1, Galileo E1, and GPS L1 bands at power levels consistent with mobile or semi-permanent Russian electronic warfare assets.

The presence of Krasukha-4, R-330ZH Zhitel, and Pole-21 systems has been visually confirmed by NATO ISR flights and commercial satellite imagery.


3. Impact on Aviation: Increasing Flight Safety Risks

The Polish Civil Aviation Authority (ULC) has issued multiple NOTAMs since mid-2024 warning of degraded GPS reliability within 100 km of the Kaliningrad border. Key reported incidents include:

  • March 2025: A Ryanair flight from Dublin to Gdańsk was forced to abort its final approach due to unreliable GPS signals and switch to a conventional NDB approach.

  • April 2025: A Lufthansa A319 experienced total GNSS failure while entering Polish airspace from Berlin. The aircraft continued using inertial navigation and landed safely in Warsaw.

In Germany, DFS (Deutsche Flugsicherung) has noted anomalous GNSS behaviour affecting enroute sectors over Berlin and Dresden, with temporary loss of ADS-B positional accuracy.

Military air operations are also impacted:

  • NATO surveillance flights operating out of Geilenkirchen (AWACS) and Łask (F-16s) have reported degraded GNSS accuracy, triggering automated avionics alerts.

  • Refuelling aircraft from Ramstein AB have altered refuelling corridors to avoid known interference zones near eastern Poland.


4. Effects on Telecommunications and Energy Systems

While aviation garners the most attention, telecoms and energy sectors in both countries are also vulnerable.

Poland

  • Polkomtel, Orange Polska, and Play have reported increased reliance on PTP-over-fiber (Precision Time Protocol) due to GNSS time signal instability at cell towers in the northeast.

  • 5G core networks, particularly those deployed near Olsztyn and Białystok, experienced timing disruptions traced to jamming affecting GNSS-disciplined clocks.

Germany

  • Major telecom operators including Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone Germany have initiated resilience auditsacross their network timing infrastructure.

  • Utilities including 50Hertz and TenneT have embedded GNSS-dependence mitigation into smart grid rollouts. Some pilot substations are now equipped with chip-scale atomic clocks (CSACs) and PTP Grandmasters not reliant on satellite time.

German regulators (BNetzA) have issued an advisory to critical national infrastructure operators outlining:

  • Steps to log and report GNSS anomalies

  • Mandates for dual-source timing solutions

  • Recommendations to engage with national CERTs on spoofing and jamming incidents


5. Military Posture and Training Evolves

In response to the growing interference threat, both nations have adapted their military doctrines:

Poland

  • The Polish Air Force has updated its standard operating procedures to include degraded navigation checklists, increased reliance on ILS/NDB procedures, and inertial flight planning.

  • Polish military units in Podlaskie and Warmian-Masurian Voivodeships are testing PNT-denied operational readiness through exercises involving navigation by terrain association and celestial cues.

Germany

  • The Bundeswehr’s Cyber and Information Domain Service (KdoCIR) has formed a GNSS Threat Response Unit, tasked with:

    • Monitoring spectrum for jamming

    • Classifying and archiving interference patterns

    • Simulating spoofing scenarios against German Army vehicles

  • At the Air Force Officer School in Fürstenfeldbruck, pilot cadets now undergo raw-data navigation drills and simulator runs involving GNSS loss mid-mission.


6. Vulnerable Civil Infrastructure: A Strategic Blind Spot

Despite growing awareness, multiple sectors remain unprepared:

  • Public transport systems in Poland’s urban areas—particularly tram and light rail systems relying on GPS for location tracking—have reported data anomalies causing timetable disruptions.

  • Truck-based logistics and cross-border freight (especially on the TEN-T North Sea–Baltic Corridor) are increasingly affected by spoofed or drifting locations, creating knock-on effects for customs processing and inventory tracking.

A 2025 audit by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) found that 46% of surveyed SMEs had no mitigation strategy for GNSS disruption, despite using GPS-enabled services for fleet management, agriculture, or payment verification.


7. Policy Responses: Playing Catch-Up

Germany and Poland are at different stages of institutional response:

Poland

  • In 2025, the Polish Ministry of Infrastructure initiated the GNSS Continuity Programme, targeting:

    • Resilience audits for telecoms and aviation

    • Education campaigns for civilian operators

    • Feasibility study into LEO-based timing solutions (e.g., OneWeb or Satelles)

  • Poland has called for the re-establishment of terrestrial navigation beacons, including ILS and VOR/DME at smaller regional airports.

Germany

  • Germany’s 2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy references GNSS resilience but stops short of mandating APNT solutions.

  • However, German policymakers are exploring joint R&D funding with France and the Netherlands to pilot an eLORAN revival for central Europe, aligned with UK developments in sovereign PNT.

The EU Space Programme Agency (EUSPA) has also included Germany and Poland in its GNSS Interference Monitoring Network, supported by funds from Horizon Europe.


8. International Coordination: NATO, EU, and the ITU

  • NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is supporting startups offering GNSS-resilient timing for dual-use infrastructure.

  • A 2025 EU Council meeting, spurred by Latvia’s diplomatic outreach, led to a provisional resolution urging harmonised GNSS incident reporting protocols, cross-border spoofing detection, and penalties against non-compliant telecoms providers.

  • Germany and Poland have jointly petitioned the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to investigate alleged Russian misuse of registered spectrum for hostile interference.


Conclusion: From Buffer Zone to Battlespace

The spread of GNSS jamming from Kaliningrad into Poland and Germany is not merely tactical interference—it is strategic signalling. Russia is testing how deeply it can disrupt European infrastructure before triggering a decisive response.

This is a turning point. Europe’s core states can no longer afford to treat GNSS as a reliable utility without redundancy. From fibre-delivered timing and inertial navigation to LEO backups and terrestrial systems, the age of trust-by-default is over.

As a senior NATO official remarked: “Jamming is not a glitch. It’s a message.”

The question is whether Europe’s response will be fast and coordinated enough to prevent that message from becoming the new normal.


Sources

 
 

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