Nation-State Actors and Telecom Sabotage – Beyond the Headlines

Introduction: Telecoms at the Frontline of Modern Conflict

Telecom infrastructure is no longer just commercial real estate—it’s now a theatre of geopolitical contest, cyber warfare, and strategic sabotage.

Whether it's fibre cuts in the Baltic, base station manipulation in Eastern Europe, or supply chain compromise in Asia, telecoms have become primary targets in state-level offensive operations.

These attacks aren't speculative—they're active, ongoing, and increasingly embedded in the grey zone between peace and war.

This blog explores how nation-states are targeting telecom infrastructure, what their goals are, and what telecom operators must do to survive in this new age of invisible conflict.

The Strategic Value of Telecom Infrastructure

Telecom networks offer four critical advantages to state-level attackers:

1. Persistent Surveillance

   Access enables monitoring of individuals, businesses, and government communications.

2. Command and Control Interruption

   Taking down or degrading networks can paralyse emergency services, defence coordination, and civil order.

3. Information Warfare

   By controlling traffic flows, attackers can delay, manipulate, or suppress digital communications.

4. Pre-positioning for Kinetic Conflict

   Compromising networks in advance enables rapid disruption if conventional hostilities begin.

The objective is not just espionage—it is systemic control.

Who Are the Primary Actors?

1. Russia

• Known for combining cyber and kinetic attacks in hybrid warfare

• Used telecom disruption as part of the Crimea annexation and Ukraine invasion

• Actively targets mobile operators and infrastructure in Eastern Europe

2. China

• Leverages commercial influence and supply chain relationships to insert surveillance capabilities

• Accused of long-term strategic infiltration, including submarine cable tapping and vendor backdoors

3. North Korea

• Focused on revenue generation via telecom fraud and attacks on mobile payment systems

• Maintains sophisticated cyber units with global reach (e.g. Lazarus Group)

4. Western Intelligence Agencies

• Conduct counter-espionage and pre-emptive cyber operations

• Snowden-era leaks revealed interception of global backbone traffic and equipment tampering

5. Regional Actors (Iran, Turkey, India, Israel, etc.)

• Engage in cross-border telecom surveillance and infrastructure manipulation, particularly in conflict zones or disputed regions

Tactics: How Nation-States Target Telecom Infrastructure

Method	Description
Firmware-level backdoors	Embedded in base stations, routers, or switching gear
Malware in network management tools	Exploits installed in OSS/BSS systems or orchestration platforms
Insider recruitment	Staff with privileged access coerced or paid to leak credentials or data
Remote access via vendor update	Compromised supply chain or remote maintenance channels used for infiltration
Physical sabotage	Fibre-optic cable cuts, base station destruction, or signal jamming
SS7/Diameter protocol exploitation	Enables location tracking, message interception, and number hijacking
Passive signal interception	Performed at submarine cable landing stations or peering points
AI-driven network manipulation	Emerging techniques using AI to identify high-value targets in traffic flows

Case Study 1: Ukraine – The Hybrid War Template

Since 2014, Ukraine has served as a testing ground for Russia’s integration of cyber and kinetic attacks.

• 2015: Telecom blackout in Donetsk/Luhansk via physical destruction and cyberattack

• 2016: SS7 exploited to locate and track Ukrainian politicians

• 2022–present: Massive DDoS attacks on telecom operators; sabotage of network hubs near combat zones

• Ongoing: Spoofed messages, SIM swap attacks, and attempted surveillance via compromised handsets

Ukraine’s resilience strategies have included:

• De-centralisation of infrastructure

• Use of Starlink as a backup

• Rapid isolation of suspicious network traffic

• Close coordination with CERT-UA and NATO cyber units

Case Study 2: Baltic States and Submarine Cables

In 2022 and 2023, unexplained damage was reported on submarine fibre cables between Sweden, Finland, and Estonia—some of which carry military and government data.

Investigations point to deliberate sabotage, potentially by foreign submersibles operating in the Baltic Sea under the guise of commercial activity.

Implications:

• Increased scrutiny of cable landing station security

• Push for redundant terrestrial backhaul routes

• Strategic interest in GNSS-independent timing systems for critical network operation

Case Study 3: Asia-Pacific – Strategic Encirclement

China’s telecom footprint across Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands has led to:

• Concerns about surveillance via vendor access to national infrastructure

• Increased deployment of state-owned fibre and satellite capacity in allied territories

• Allegations of tampering with switching systems in host country exchanges

Many Pacific Island states are now re-evaluating their telecom vendor agreements under pressure from Five Eyes nationsconcerned about infrastructure integrity.

The Cost of Inaction

Nation-state telecom sabotage has direct and indirect consequences:

• Loss of National Command and ControlDisabling networks during conflict paralyses military and civil coordination.

• Long-Term Data ExfiltrationPersistent access enables comprehensive intelligence gathering on political, economic, and scientific targets.

• Economic DestabilisationAttack-induced blackouts hurt banks, mobile payments, logistics, and emergency services.

• Reputational CollapseOperators found complicit—or simply negligent—may lose licences, customers, or market access.

• Weaponised InfrastructureIn worst-case scenarios, hostile actors could turn your own network against you—sending false alerts, rerouting traffic, or blackholing strategic comms.

Countermeasures: What Operators and Governments Must Do

1. Embed Threat Intelligence in Operations

• Collaborate with national CERTs, Five Eyes, and EU cybersecurity agencies

• Subscribe to military-grade threat intelligence feeds

  
  

2. Map Critical Dependencies

• Identify single points of failure and geo-political vendor risks

• Conduct tabletop simulations of sabotage scenarios

  
  

3. Implement Isolation Protocols

• Enable rapid segmentation or shutdown of compromised network segments

• Automate fallback to backup routing paths

  
  

4. Establish Vendor Security Frameworks

• Mandate firmware auditing, secure update mechanisms, and escrow access for equipment

• Create blacklists of vendors under foreign intelligence control

  
  

5. Secure OSS/BSS and Management Planes

• Restrict access from international IP ranges

• Monitor for anomalous administrative activity or account compromise

  
  

6. Build Alternative Communication Channels

• Secure government/military channels outside commercial infrastructure

• Invest in terrestrial backup navigation and timing systems (e.g., eLORAN)

A Telecom Board’s Role in National Security

Telecom boards are not just business stewards—they are infrastructure custodians.

Boards must:

• Recognise telecom as critical national infrastructure

• Demand geopolitical risk analysis as part of procurement

• Support investment in security over short-term financial metrics

• Ensure telecom resilience is embedded into corporate strategy and national dialogue

Failure to act leaves the network open—not just to disruption, but to strategic defeat.

Conclusion: Infrastructure Is Now a Target

Telecoms have always enabled war. Today, they are part of it.

From the submarine cable to the SIM card, from the OSS dashboard to the 5G core, nation-state actors are working—often invisibly—to compromise, control, or collapse the systems we rely on.

This is no longer about hackers in hoodies or anonymous attacks from afar. It’s about deliberate, targeted, state-sponsored operations that treat your network as a beachhead.

The next war won’t start with missiles. It may begin with a silent outage, a rerouted packet, or a compromised base station.

Are you ready?