Hybrid Warfare and the Strategic Implications of GNSS Disruption
- Bridge Connect
- Jul 28
- 5 min read
Introduction: More Than a Signal Problem
At first glance, GNSS disruption seems like a technical nuisance: pilots lose GPS lock, delivery vans go off-track, mobile towers lose timing sync. But step back, and a more serious picture emerges. GNSS interference—particularly jamming and spoofing—is now a deliberate instrument of hybrid warfare, employed by state actors like Russia to erode trust, disrupt systems, and project power in the grey zone below the threshold of conventional war.
“Disabling your infrastructure without firing a shot—that’s the essence of the new battlefield,”— NATO Electronic Warfare Centre (2025)
As Europe becomes more digitally interconnected and GNSS-dependent, the ability to deny, degrade, or manipulate these satellite services becomes a powerful strategic weapon. This article explores:
What hybrid warfare is, and how GNSS disruption fits within it
Russia’s doctrinal approach to grey-zone conflict
Real-world examples of GNSS use in psychological, military, and economic coercion
The cumulative impact on European resilience and deterrence
What strategic responses are emerging—or still missing
1. Hybrid Warfare: Definition and Evolution
Hybrid warfare—sometimes called grey-zone conflict or asymmetric confrontation—combines conventional military power with non-military instruments: cyberattacks, information operations, economic coercion, sabotage, and electronic warfare. Its goals:
Create confusion and delay attribution
Avoid escalation to open warfare
Destabilise opponents internally
Weaken alliance cohesion and public trust
The Russian military thinker General Valery Gerasimov first formalised this in what Western analysts call the “Gerasimov Doctrine”—emphasising that in the 21st century, the line between war and peace has blurred.
In this landscape, GNSS disruption is not collateral—it is core.
2. Why GNSS Is a Prime Target in Hybrid Conflict
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems based on GNSS are attractive targets for hybrid operations because they are:
Omnipresent across military, civilian, and economic sectors
Technically fragile (easily jammed or spoofed)
Difficult to attribute (few nations can conclusively pinpoint sources)
Heavily trusted by automated systems and decision-makers
By targeting GNSS, adversaries like Russia can:
Paralyse or mislead navigation systems for aircraft, drones, or ships
Disrupt telecoms and power grids through corrupted timing
Sow doubt in public institutions’ ability to guarantee safety and order
Trigger economic ripple effects across logistics, finance, and transport
This makes GNSS disruption a perfect “scalpel” in the hybrid arsenal—capable of causing outsized disruption with minimal visibility or accountability.
3. Russia’s Electronic Warfare Doctrine: Escalation in the Shadows
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has heavily invested in electronic warfare (EW) as a central pillar of hybrid operations. Unlike the Cold War, where EW was a battlefield tactic, today it is an integrated strategic capability.
Key characteristics of Russia’s EW doctrine:
Forward deployment of mobile jamming units (e.g. R-330Zh Zhitel, Krasukha-4, Pole-21)
Regional interference campaigns tied to political flashpoints (e.g. near Kaliningrad, Crimea, Belarus)
Denial of service to hostile surveillance assets (e.g. NATO AWACS, U.S. MQ-9 drones)
Disruption of civil aviation and economic flows in adversarial territories
Examples:
Syria (2018–2020): Russian EW units based at Khmeimim Air Base jammed GPS signals over Eastern Mediterranean to deter NATO ISR flights [1].
Crimea and Donbas (2022–present): Massive GNSS spoofing and jamming disrupted Ukrainian drone operations, affecting not only military missions but also humanitarian corridors and logistics.
Kaliningrad/Baltics (2023–2025): Thousands of GNSS interference incidents logged across Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland [2].
4. Psychological and Political Effects: A Form of Strategic Messaging
GNSS disruption isn’t just about technical denial—it sends a message.
When passenger aircraft are forced to reroute or telecom systems degrade unexpectedly, public trust falters. Media narratives emerge: “Is our infrastructure secure?”, “Can we trust the government to protect us?”, “Are we already under attack?”
This psychological effect:
Weakens democratic confidence
Normalises a state of technological vulnerability
Pressures governments into reactive, not strategic, postures
Even without physical damage, GNSS jamming creates what NATO has termed “ambient threat pressure”—a condition of persistent, low-grade stress across sectors that depletes readiness and resilience.
5. Economic Impact: Disruption Without Detonation
The economic cost of GNSS disruption is vastly underestimated. Conservative models from the European GNSS Agency (now EUSPA) suggest that:
GNSS contributes over €100 billion annually to the EU economy
A one-day outage could cost €1–2 billion, mostly through logistics, aviation, and finance disruptions [3]
Recent examples:
Baltic airlines are incurring tens of millions of euros in additional fuel costs, delays, and rerouting due to jammed GNSS corridors
Port logistics in Gdańsk and Klaipėda have reported increased error rates in automated tracking and offloading
Cross-border trucking firms in Poland and Germany report delivery inefficiencies and insurance liability disputes linked to spoofed positions
All this without a single missile launched.
6. Cumulative Risk: Systemic Fragility in a Networked Society
The threat posed by GNSS disruption is magnified by the interconnectedness of digital systems. Timing from GNSS is used in:
Telecoms (5G synchronization, handovers)
Energy (synchrophasors and SCADA coordination)
Finance (timestamping in trading, ATMs, and audits)
Data centres (transaction consistency across sites)
Public transport and rail (location reporting, signalling)
A well-timed, region-wide GNSS blackout could:
Disrupt mobile networks and emergency response systems
Trigger false trading alerts or flash crashes
Cause grid instability if phase mismatches go undetected
In a 2024 joint simulation between Germany and Sweden’s civil contingency agencies, a 96-hour simulated GNSS outage caused:
3x increase in flight cancellations
Telecom call-drop rates exceeding 40%
Grid balancing failures in regional energy dispatch
Software crashes in GPS-locked logistics systems
7. The Legal and Normative Grey Zone
GNSS jamming occurs in a regulatory vacuum. International law—particularly the ITU Radio Regulations—prohibits interference with registered radio services. However:
Attribution is technically complex
Enforcement is politically fraught
Civilian jamming often exploits military exemptions or dual-use ambiguity
Russia routinely denies involvement or blames “solar storms” and “malfunctioning user equipment.”
In 2025, a coalition of 17 EU countries called for the suspension of Russian and Belarusian ITU frequency rightsfollowing evidence of coordinated GNSS interference. But such moves are unprecedented—and risk geopolitical backlash [4].
8. Strategic Responses: What Is Being Done—And What’s Missing
European states are starting to respond, but progress is uneven.
What’s underway:
National GNSS interference monitoring stations (e.g. Lithuania, Sweden)
Deployment of eLORAN testbeds in the UK, Norway, and France
Civil aviation safety protocols for RNP fallback and VOR/DME navigation
Telecom industry shift toward PTP over fiber for timing
What’s still needed:
A pan-European APNT strategy for critical infrastructure
Mandated resilience audits for operators reliant on GNSS
Common incident classification and reporting framework
Investment in LEO PNT constellations as partial GNSS alternatives (e.g. Satelles, Xona)
Simulated hybrid warfare scenarios including GNSS loss for national exercises
Conclusion: Redefining Deterrence in a GNSS-Dependent Age
In the 20th century, deterrence was about nuclear weapons and force posturing. In the 21st century, deterrence must include resilience—especially resilience to invisible, deniable, and technically disruptive acts like GNSS jamming.
Russia’s use of GNSS interference is not experimental. It is strategic, intentional, and escalating. Europe’s task is to respond with equally strategic planning—integrating satellite independence into cyber, defence, economic, and infrastructure policy.
“You don’t need to destroy a country to break it. You just need to make it unsure of where it is,”— Strategic Studies Institute (2025)