Future Outlook and Policy Recommendations for European PNT Resilience

Bridge Connect
Jul 28
4 min read

Introduction: Turning Crisis Into Strategic Reset

Over the past five blog posts, we've traced a sobering trajectory. GNSS interference is no longer a hypothetical vulnerability or a regional problem. It is a continental-scale, multi-sector risk driven by a combination of state aggression, civil-military infrastructure dependencies, and deep technological over-reliance.

Europe is now at a crossroads. It must decide whether to treat GNSS resilience as a core strategic capability, or continue assuming that GPS, Galileo and other constellations will always be available and trustworthy.

This final post lays out:

Strategic policy recommendations
Investment priorities
Governance reforms
Cross-sector coordination mechanisms
A future vision for European Assured PNT (APNT)

1. Strategic Framing: PNT as Critical Infrastructure

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services should be formally recognised in EU, NATO, and national frameworks as Critical Infrastructure, on par with:

Energy and utilities
Telecoms and digital services
Financial systems
Defence and transportation

Why?

Because PNT systems are the invisible nervous system of all the above.

A regulatory baseline for PNT should:

Require dual-source timing for all critical infrastructure operators
Mandate risk assessments for GNSS disruption
Treat intentional interference (jamming/spoofing) as a national security threat

“We protect roads and wires. Why not the signals that synchronise our economies?”— UK National PNT Office, 2025

2. Five Core Policy Recommendations

1. Establish National PNT Resilience Offices

Following the UK model, every EU and NATO member should create a permanent PNT office that:

Audits dependency across sectors
Coordinates civil/military fallback systems
Hosts national awareness campaigns
Drives innovation in APNT

These offices must be empowered, budgeted, and connected across borders.

2. Mandate Resilience Standards

Regulators should require that infrastructure operators implement:

At least two independent PNT sources (e.g., GNSS + fiber, GNSS + eLORAN)
Spoofing and jamming detection as part of cyber/information security protocols
Periodic drills simulating GNSS outages

EU-wide mandates could be modelled after existing directives for electricity (ENTSO-E) or cyber resilience (NIS2 Directive).

3. Rebuild Terrestrial Navigation Networks

eLORAN should be scaled as a pan-European public service with:

High-powered transmitters covering maritime corridors, power/telecom zones, and high-density population centres
Interoperability with UK, French, and Norwegian systems
Integrated time codes to serve as sovereign timing sources

This effort could be housed within the European Space Programme Agency (EUSPA) and co-funded under the Digital Europe Programme.

4. Accelerate LEO-Based Backup Timing and Navigation

The EU should invest in LEO-PNT constellations either through:

A dedicated LEO layer within Galileo Gen 2
Partnership with trusted providers (e.g. Satelles, OneWeb)
ESA/NATO dual-use payload coordination

Initial use cases include:

Secure military timing
Urban timing for 5G and financial services
Maritime and aviation backup lanes

5. Integrate GNSS Risk Into Defence and Civil Protection Plans

PNT denial must be treated as:

A warfighting domain (integrated into electronic warfare doctrine)
A continuity-of-government issue
A public safety contingency

NATO exercises should regularly simulate GNSS denial. Civil protection authorities should include it in disaster planning—alongside EMP, cyberattack, and power failure.

3. Sector-Specific Priorities

Aviation

Multi-layer navigation capability at all major airports (ILS, VOR/DME, RNP fallback)
Pilot proficiency in non-GNSS approaches as licensing standard
ADS-B and TCAS spoof detection research and regulation
EASA to publish and enforce GNSS interference risk zones and operational directives

Telecoms

Mandatory GNSS holdover capability in all cell towers and 5G nodes
PTP over fiber as a national infrastructure priority
Audit and test all inter-country backhaul for timing redundancy
Create shared timing-as-a-service hubs (similar to IXPs)

Power and Energy

Triple-redundant timing layers in SCADA, synchrophasor and grid balancing systems
Fiber-delivered PTP and local oscillator holdover to become mandatory
Introduce smart meters and substation controllers capable of functioning without GNSS
Incorporate PNT loss in national energy continuity exercises

Finance and Payments

All transaction systems to use certified traceable time with fallback
Cross-border timestamp validation frameworks within ECB
Inclusion of GNSS dependency in financial services continuity assessments
Investigate LEO-based time authentication for blockchain and smart contracts

4. Cross-Border Coordination Mechanisms

Europe’s PNT strategy must be supranational. Recommended instruments:

EU PNT Resilience Working Group (co-led by EUSPA and ENISA)
Shared PNT incident database, accessible to certified infrastructure operators
European PNT Resilience Directive (2026) setting binding requirements for critical sectors
NATO/EU joint doctrine for PNT-denied operations (to inform both military and civil resilience)

5. Funding and Investment Options

Allocate Digital Europe and Horizon Europe funding to APNT technology development and trials
Use the Connecting Europe Facility to fund cross-border eLORAN and PTP infrastructure
Include PNT testing and redundancy in CEF2 transport and energy projects
Expand ESA and EUSPA calls for LEO PNT payload development
Encourage PPP (Public-Private Partnership) consortia for timing-as-a-service ventures

6. Innovation Gaps and R&D Needs

Jamming/spoofing detection analytics for civilian GNSS devices
Portable ground-based backup PNT kits for field deployments
Resilient drones and autonomous vehicles that can operate in PNT-denied areas
AI-based signal anomaly detection in timing-dependent systems (e.g. trading, grid)
Integrated cockpit solutions for aviation GNSS spoof resilience

Europe must treat GNSS disruption not only as a threat, but as a catalyst for innovation in navigation, timing, and trust infrastructure.

Conclusion: Resilience Is the New Strategic Deterrent

Europe’s geopolitical reality has changed. PNT signals can and will be denied—by adversaries, by technical failure, or by natural disruption. The response must not be reactive. It must be systemic.

Just as Europe built energy resilience in response to gas dependency, it must now build PNT resilience in response to GNSS vulnerability. The infrastructure, policy tools, and technological baselines exist. What’s needed is strategic clarity and executive will.

“Assured positioning and timing is not just an engineering problem. It’s a pillar of sovereignty in the information age.”— NATO Science and Technology Organization, 2025

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