Defending the Digital Lifelines: FCC and Allies Tighten Control Over Submarine Cable Infrastructure

Introduction – From Hidden Utility to National Security Priority

Beneath the world’s oceans lies the infrastructure that keeps the modern economy alive: the global network of submarine fibre-optic cables. These systems carry over 95% of international data traffic — every video conference, every market trade, every AI data transfer between continents.

For decades, the regulatory conversation around these cables was narrow: licensing, capacity, and repair.

That’s no longer enough. In August 2025, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took decisive action to streamline domestic cable approvals while blocking access for foreign adversaries, citing an urgent need to secure the nation’s critical digital arteries.

The FCC’s New Approach – Speed for Allies, Barriers for Adversaries

The FCC’s updated rules, announced 7 August 2025, introduce three key changes:

1. Presumption of Denial – Any licence application from an entity controlled by a “foreign adversary” (notably China, but also Russia, Iran, and others) now starts from a position of rejection.

2. Ban on Covered Equipment – No submarine cable linked to U.S. networks can use components listed on the FCC’s “Covered List” of high-risk technologies.

3. Streamlined Process for Trusted Operators – Allied and domestic projects meeting strict security standards will see faster approvals, reducing deployment bottlenecks.

These measures only apply to cable systems with U.S. landing points, but the ripple effects are likely to influence global cable procurement decisions.

Political Backing and Strategic Rationale

The move is closely aligned with the America First Investment Policy memorandum of February 2025, which aims to protect strategic infrastructure while encouraging secure investment.

“Continued investment and streamlining our approval processes will enhance the resiliency of these networks and expand our global technological dominance” said Brett Guthrie, Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce.

The underlying logic is simple: control the cables, control the flow of global data — and by extension, the security and competitiveness of the digital economy.

Europe’s Parallel Play – The EU Action Plan on Cable Security

The FCC is not acting in isolation. In February 2025, the European Union launched its Action Plan on Cable Security, built around a “whole resilience cycle” covering:

• Prevention – Deploying “smart” subsea cables with redundancy to mitigate single-point failures.

• Detection – Expanding threat monitoring in strategic maritime zones such as the Baltic and Mediterranean.

• Response & Recovery – Establishing a coordinated crisis framework and a reserve fleet of cable repair vessels.

• Deterrence – Using drones, sensors, satellite monitoring, and sanctions to discourage hostile activity.

The EU has backed its plan with nearly €1 billion from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital programme, targeting both inter-European and intercontinental routes, with emphasis on Africa, the Atlantic, and the Nordic/Baltic regions.

Global Coordination – ITU’s New Advisory Body

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has launched its International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience, signalling that this is now a priority issue on the multilateral agenda.

Three working groups are focused on:

• Rapid deployment and repair.

• Risk identification and monitoring.

• Connectivity and route diversity.

Participation spans governments (including China, the UK, South Africa) and development banks, with the body gaining visibility at major forums such as the Internet Governance Forum and WSIS+20.

The Strategic Risk Landscape

The FCC’s messaging is unambiguous: submarine cables are now more vital - and more exposed - than at any point in history.

As of December 2022:

• 90 FCC-licensed cable systems had over 5,300 Tbps of available capacity.

• 6,800 Tbps in planned capacity was expected by 2024 — although current figures are likely higher.

The threat environment includes:

• State surveillance via cable landing stations or in-line repeaters.

• Physical disruption through anchor dragging, fishing gear, or sabotage.

• Military mapping of routes for potential interdiction.

Future Measures Under Consideration

The FCC is inviting public comment on further proposals, including:

• Incentives for U.S.-flagged repair vessels – addressing repair sovereignty, though the current U.S. fleet is small.

• Promotion of “trusted technology” abroad – leveraging diplomatic channels to shape allied procurement.

• Exemptions from Team Telecom review – for low-risk applications meeting the highest security standards.

Strategic Takeaways for Industry Leaders

• Vendors & Operators – Supply chain vetting is now a market access requirement, not an optional safeguard.

• Investors – Expect more predictable project approvals for allied projects, but higher compliance costs.

• Governments – The FCC and EU examples are likely to inspire similar regulatory frameworks elsewhere.

This is not just about blocking one country’s equipment — it’s about rebuilding the governance model for the most important communications infrastructure on earth.

Conclusion – The Undersea Contest Intensifies

The FCC’s August 2025 action, combined with parallel EU and ITU initiatives, represents a strategic hardening of the internet’s backbone. The transatlantic approach now emphasises not just building faster networks, but building trusted, resilient, and defensible networks.

U.S., EU, and ITU submarine cable security initiatives

Global Policy Landscape: Submarine Cable Security Initiatives

United States (FCC)

• Presumption of denial for foreign adversaries

• Ban on Covered List equipment

• Fast-track for trusted operators

• Future: US-flagged repair vessel incentives

European Union (EU)

• Whole resilience cycle: prevention, detection, response, deterrence

• €1bn CEF Digital funding for cables

• Reserve fleet of repair vessels

• Smart subsea cables with redundancy

International (ITU)

• International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience

• Working groups: deployment/repair, risk monitoring, route diversity

• Global participation (China, UK, South Africa, development banks)

• High-level visibility at IGF and WSIS +20

As geopolitical tensions increasingly spill into digital infrastructure, submarine cables will be both targets and tools in global competition. For decision-makers, the question is no longer whether to treat cables as strategic assets — but how quickly you can adapt to this new reality.