Baltic and Nordic Frontline: How the North Is Navigating Without GNSS

Bridge Connect
Jul 28
5 min read

Introduction: The New Frontline of Electronic Warfare

If the Cold War had the Fulda Gap, today’s hybrid warfare has the Baltic and Nordic airspace. Stretching from Kaliningrad to Lapland, this region is now the epicentre of GNSS jamming in Europe, as Russia increasingly uses electronic warfare (EW) to project power without firing a shot. With strategic locations bordering Russia’s western flank, these countries are not only geographically exposed—they are digitally vulnerable.

Between early 2024 and mid-2025, GNSS jamming incidents in this region multiplied exponentially. Lithuanian authorities reported over 1,000 documented jamming episodes in a single month in 2025—compared to just 46 in the same month the previous year [1]. Pilots, mariners, border guards, and military units have all experienced interference that undermines their ability to operate safely and predictably.

This post examines:

The scale and nature of the threat
National and military responses in Finland, Estonia, Sweden, and Lithuania
Civil sector implications
How these states are building resilience beyond GNSS

1. Russia’s Jamming Strategy in the North

The Russian military has significantly upgraded its western electronic warfare capability since 2022. Kaliningrad hosts a suite of mobile EW systems including:

R-330Zh “Zhitel” – effective across GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, and Inmarsat frequencies
Krasukha-4 – designed to jam airborne radar and reconnaissance drones
Murmansk-BN – strategic EW system with an 8,000 km range, used for long-wave disruption

In addition to Kaliningrad, mobile jamming systems have been deployed in Leningrad Oblast, the Kola Peninsula, and parts of occupied Belarus, enabling Russia to cover most of the Baltic Sea and much of Northern Europe with overlapping jamming coverage.

2. The Baltic States: Small Nations with Big Risks

Lithuania

Lithuania’s proximity to Kaliningrad makes it one of the most consistently jammed countries in Europe. In 2025:

GNSS jamming events were recorded at Vilnius and Kaunas airports almost daily
Emergency responders reported disruptions in GPS-coordinated dispatch systems
Government agencies confirmed interference emanated from multiple ground-based sites in Kaliningrad [1]

Lithuania has responded with:

Deployment of mobile detection units to triangulate sources
Expansion of terrestrial navigation aids (ILS, DME, VOR) at major airports
Diplomatic leadership in EU-level efforts to sanction Russia through ITU radio coordination

The country has also invested in GNSS interference monitoring stations across its territory in cooperation with NATO and the European GNSS Agency (EUSPA).

Estonia

Estonia has long viewed cyber and electronic warfare as existential threats. While it has not seen jamming at the same frequency as Lithuania, it has:

Developed a classified APNT roadmap for state continuity and defence
Integrated GNSS spoofing detection into its national CERT operations
Trained municipal authorities in map-and-compass navigation drills during national defence exercises

Estonia’s Civil Aviation Authority has also instructed commercial pilots flying into Tallinn to report GNSS anomalies and prepare for procedural approaches.

Latvia

Latvia’s air navigation services and telecom operators have documented hundreds of low-level interference events in the east of the country, especially near Daugavpils and Rezekne.

Latvia took the diplomatic lead in 2025, coordinating a formal EU Council letter signed by 17 states calling for coordinated sanctions and infrastructure audits [2].

3. Finland: Navigating in a Denied Environment

Finland, which joined NATO in 2023, borders Russia for over 1,300 kilometres and has long anticipated electronic warfare scenarios. The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) have adopted a doctrine that assumes degraded PNT as a baseline:

All conscripts are trained in manual map-reading and compass navigation
Field units operate tactical PNT systems combining inertial, celestial, and terrain-based navigation
Finnish airlines and civil aviation agencies have incorporated fallback protocols into their standard operating procedures

In March 2025, a Finnish Defence Ministry white paper proposed establishing a Nordic terrestrial backup system for timing and navigation—potentially extending across Sweden and Norway using eLORAN or fiber-timing systems.

4. Sweden: Layering Redundancy into Civil Aviation and Telecoms

Sweden is a pioneer in telecom time synchronisation, and its large landmass makes it vulnerable to GPS jamming from both Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula. Recent measures include:

Installation of passive monitoring networks around key airports
Requirements for 5G operators to maintain terrestrial PTP (Precision Time Protocol) fallback systems
Funding for pilot training on GNSS-degraded approach procedures, especially at Gotland and Stockholm Arlanda airports

In the Swedish archipelago, ferries and coastal patrols have experienced repeated signal loss and now rely on radar fixes and inertial backups.

5. Civil Aviation: Flying Blind Over the Baltic

From January to June 2025:

Over 3,000 GNSS anomalies were reported by commercial pilots in the Baltic and Nordic regions
The EASA issued Special Advisory Notices for the entire Baltic FIR region
Airlines including Finnair, Ryanair, Wizz Air, and Lufthansa conducted route diversions or held in air until conventional navigation was restored

Most modern aircraft are equipped with inertial reference systems, but these have limitations:

Drift increases over time without GNSS correction
Non-precision approaches carry higher minima
Many regional airports lack upgraded ground-based aids

The GNSS Vulnerability Assessment for Airspace Users (GVA-AU) task force, initiated by EUROCONTROL in 2024, now recommends that all Baltic-bound carriers maintain procedures for alternate navigation, including:

Raw data flying proficiency
Terrain-avoidance protocols
Use of SIGMET and NOTAM alerts for GNSS degradation

6. Telecom and Critical Infrastructure Responses

Telecom providers across the Nordics have started investing in GNSS-independent time sources, including:

High-stability atomic clocks (e.g. Rubidium, Cesium)
Precision time delivery over dark fibre (PTP over DWDM)
Partnerships with LEO constellations for space-based timing resilience

In Estonia, the government has incentivised GNSS-resilient data centres, requiring:

Dual PNT input sources (e.g., GPS + LEO or GPS + atomic)
Daily spoofing detection logs
Quarterly GNSS outage drills

In Sweden and Finland, electrical transmission system operators (TSOs) are now incorporating PNT risk assessmentsinto their smart grid rollouts, especially around synchrophasor deployment.

7. Military Adaptation and Training

Military forces in all four countries now assume GNSS denial as a standard combat condition. Examples include:

Finnish soldiers practicing manual artillery triangulation
Swedish Navy vessels using visual navigation and dead reckoning
Lithuanian border guards receiving training in spoofing recognition
Estonian cyber and EW units maintaining 24/7 monitoring of GNSS interference patterns

In 2024, NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise featured a scenario in which GNSS was jammed for 72 hours. Baltic and Nordic troops conducted coordinated responses using traditional and digital PNT hybrids.

8. The Role of Monitoring and Public Tools

The emergence of platforms like GPSJam.org and academic collaborations (e.g., the Finnish-Romanian GNSS Interference Mapping Lab) has made real-time tracking of interference patterns accessible to both professionals and the public.

Monitoring stations funded by the EU and NATO are now being deployed across:

Lithuania (10 permanent sites)
Sweden (5 mobile jamming triangulation trucks)
Finland (coastal arrays at Uusikaupunki, Oulu, and Rovaniemi)

These data sets feed into regional airspace management, maritime operations, and even public transport planning.

Conclusion: The New Normal in the North

For the Baltic and Nordic countries, GNSS jamming is not a theoretical future threat—it is daily reality. These nations, though small in population, are leading Europe in their response. They demonstrate that resilience is not a function of size or wealth, but of mindset, coordination, and strategic foresight.

“We are preparing for the day when satellites go dark—not because it’s likely, but because it’s possible,” said a senior Finnish military official in a June 2025 interview.

That preparation may be the difference between chaos and continuity in a future crisis.

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